University of Memphis

University of Memphis Digital Commons
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
4-22-2014

NLSR: Named Data Link State Routing Protocol
A K M Mahmudul Hoque

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Hoque, A K M Mahmudul, "NLSR: Named Data Link State Routing Protocol" (2014). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. 883.
https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd/883

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by University of Memphis Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of
Memphis Digital Commons. For more information, please contact khggerty@memphis.edu.

NLSR: NAMED-DATA LINK STATE ROUTING PROTOCOL
by
A K M Mahmudul Hoque

A Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulﬁllment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science
Major: Computer Science

The University of Memphis
May 2014

c A K M Mahmudul Hoque, 2014

ii

To my loving wife
and family

iii

Acknowledgment
First and foremost, I would like to take the opportunity to thank Allah, the Creator,
the Lord of the Worlds, the Beneﬁcent, and the most Merciful, for giving me the
courage and ability to complete this task.
I express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Associate Professor Lan Wang,
for her constant support, encouragement, inspiration, and guidance, and for having
her vote of conﬁdence in me. She has consistently allowed me to pursue my research
ideas, provided invaluable feedback to keep me focused and on track, and helped me
advance my research. She has been a true mentor, not only in the avenue of research,
but also in every other aspect of my life. I would also like to thank Dr. Timothy
Hnat and Dr. David Lin for their constructive comments and insightful feedback.
I am truly grateful to have such a wonderful wife and family, who are always
inspiring me throughout my life.
With the utmost appreciation, I thank the members of the NDN research group
and the members of the University of Memphis Networking Lab, including Syed Obaid
Amin, Marc Badrian, Vince Lehman, Ashlesh Gawande, Nic Smith, and Minsheng
Zhang. I am also thankful to project collaborators Beichuan Zhang and Lixia Zhang
for their added support and invaluable feedback.
Finally, I would like to thank the University of Memphis, for providing me with
an excellent research environment as well as supporting me throughout my academic
career.

iv

Abstract
Named Data Networking (NDN) is a fundamental paradigm shift from the
current Internet where, packets are forwarded by name instead of the destination IP
address. By explicitly naming each packet and signing data, NDN enables some
revolutionary features like data authenticity, multicast data delivery, and multipath
forwarding with adaptive strategies. For NDN to work well over a network, it
requires a routing protocol which will not only need to propagate name reachability
in the network, but also compute ranked multipath forwarding entries for each name
by ensuring the security of routing exchanges. Moreover, moving from a traditional,
long studied, and well-understood IP based thinking process to name based routing
makes designing an eﬃcient routing protocol for NDN more challenging. This thesis
presents Named-data Link State Routing (NLSR), which propagates name
reachability and computes ranked multiple nexthops for forwarding. NLSR also
takes advantage of inherent data authenticity features to provide simple yet robust
security for routing exchanges.
This thesis focuses on discussing four functional design goals of NLSR. First and
foremost is designing a naming scheme for routers, routing updates, and routers’
cryptographic certiﬁcates. The second design goal is to make a rational choice
between two available synchronization protocols for disseminating routing updates
in NDN. The third goal is designing an eﬃcient algorithm to produce multiple
nexthops for each forwarding entry. The fourth and ﬁnal goal is to produce a
self-suﬃcient design for naming, distributing cryptographic certiﬁcates in the
network, and deriving trust from those certiﬁcates for routing updates.
The goal of this thesis is to design and evaluate a routing protocol, which will
well serve the needs of NDN. NLSR moves from the conventional IP based routing
to name based routing and from single path forwarding to multiple path forwarding.
We have evaluated NLSR, and compared to IP link state routing protocol, it oﬀers
v

more eﬃcient routing update propagation, inherent update authentication, and
native support of multipath forwarding. NLSR provides a great learning experience
to develop an application on top of NDN which requires meticulous consideration in
namespace design, careful design of the trust model for data authentication, and
most importantly, a mental adjustment to NDN’s design philosophy of using
interest-data exchanges for routing messages. NLSR is the ﬁrst distributed routing
protocol in NDN for a single authoritative domain and the ﬁrst step toward
developing and extending protocols for inter-domain routing.

vi

Table of Contents
List of Tables

ix

List of Figures

x

1 Introduction

1

2 Background
2.1 Named Data Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.1 NDN Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.2 Hierarchical name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.3 NDN node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.4 Consumer-driven communication . . . . . . . . .
2.1.5 Intelligent forwarding plane . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.6 Data centric security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Link State Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.1 Building Adjacency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.2 Link State Advertisement (LSA) synchronization
2.2.3 Routing table calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 Design and Implementation
3.1 Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 LSAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 LSDB Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.1 NDN Synchronization protocol (Sync)
3.3.2 ChronoSync . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 Multipath Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5 Failures and Recovery Detection . . . . . . . .
3.6 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6.1 Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6.2 Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.7 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 Evaluation

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

5
5
5
6
6
7
8
9
9
9
9
10

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

11
12
14
15
15
17
19
20
21
22
23
24
26

vii

5 Related Work

32

6 Future Work

34

7 Conclusion

35

Bibliography

36

viii

List of Tables
3.1

Contents of an LSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

3.2

Keys Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

4.1

OSPFN Message Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

4.2

NLSR Message Count

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

4.3

NLSR Message Count with Piggy Backing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

ix

List of Figures
2.1

Packets of NDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

2.2

Forwarding plane of NDN Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.3

Consumer-driven communication supporting multicast delivery . . . .

8

3.1

LSA dissemination from router to router via NDN Sync . . . . . . . .

17

3.2

LSA dissemination from router to router via ChronoSync . . . . . . .

18

3.3

Adjacency failure and recovery detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

3.4

Signing and veriﬁcation process of each packet . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

3.5

Block diagram of NLSR modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

4.1

Network Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

4.2

NLSR CPU utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

4.3

NLSR Average CPU utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

4.4

NLSR Convergence time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

x

Citation to Previous Publication
A large portion of this thesis appeared in the following publication:
• A K M M. Hoque, S. O. Amin, A. Alyyan, B. Zhang, L. Wang. “NLSR:
Name-data Link State Routing Protocol”, In the proceedings of ACM
SIGCOMM ICN Workshop, August 2013

xi

1 Introduction
The Internet has been evolving since its birth, and communication in the current
Internet is dominated by content distribution. To keep up with evolving Internet
communication, Internet researchers proposed Named Data Networking (NDN), a
new architecture for the future Internet. NDN is a fundamental architectural shift
from the current Internet, in which each packet carries a name instead of a
destination IP address. Unlike IP, NDN forwards a packet by looking at the names
of the packets [5]. Communication in NDN is consumer driven; that is, a consumer
issues interest for data by mentioning the name in an interest packet. This interest
is forwarded to a producer by looking at the name. A producer replies with a data
packet containing the name, data, and the signature of the producer. Upon
receiving the data, the consumer can verify the authenticity of the data. Thus,
because each packet is named and all data is signed, NDN inherently enables
features like data authenticity, in-network caching of data, multicast delivery of
packets, and an adaptive forwarding strategy for multipath.
NDN is evolving as the future of the Internet, and for proper network
functionality, it needs a routing protocol for generating Forwarding Information
Base (FIB) entries and installing them in the forwarding table of a NDN node.
Each FIB entry of NDN contains a name preﬁx and a set of nexthops through which
this name preﬁx can be reached. When any interest comes to an NDN node, the
interest’s name preﬁx is matched against the forwarding entries in the forwarding
table to forward that interest. Moreover, NDN has an inherent loop prevention
1

technique [5, 6], which allows the use of multiple nexthops for forwarding any packet
in the network. So, for eﬃcient and eﬀective adaptive forwarding, NDN needs a
routing protocol, that will not only produce name-based forwarding tables but also
support multiple nexthops for forwarding entries. Motivated by the need for an
eﬀective name based routing protocol for NDN, we present the Named-data Link
State Routing (NLSR) protocol which supports name based routing and produces
ranked multiple nexthops for forwarding entries. NLSR is built on top of NDN, so
every routing update exchange is done in the form: interest/data. Like IP link-state
routing protocols such as OSPF [7], NLSR disseminates Link State Advertisement
(LSA) updates, builds a network topology from LSA updates, calculates shortest
paths, and generates next hops for forwarding entries. However, unlike IP, NLSR
produces ranked multiple nexthops for insertion into the forwarding table of an
NDN node. Moreover, NLSR takes advantage of data authenticity, which is a built
in feature of NDN, to ensure authenticity of routing update exchanges.
The contribution of this thesis is the ﬁrst distributed routing protocol in NDN,
NLSR, which focuses on answering four main design questions: the ﬁrst and
foremost question is how do we design an eﬀective naming scheme to name routers,
routing updates, and routers’ certiﬁcates? In NDN, every entity is identiﬁed by
name. Although NLSR can use any underlying protocol for routing exchanges, each
entity in the protocol needs to be named. So, this is a design challenge in mapping
our traditional IP-based cognitive model to NDN’s name-based model.
The second design goal is to choose or design an eﬃcient routing updates
synchronization protocol to disseminate updates in the network with minimal delay
time while also ensuring correctness. Moreover, where in IP routing protocol an
update is pushed in the network, the NDN philosophy allows NLSR to pull updates
from it. Instead of reinventing the wheel, we evaluated two available
synchronization protocols in NDN, NDN-Sync (hop by hop dataset synchronization
2

protocol) and chronoSync (distributed dataset synchronizaition protocl), in order to
ﬁnd a functionally correct, optimal, and well suited for NLSR.
The third goal of NLSR design is to create an algorithm which produces ranked
multiple nexthops to facilitate multipath forwarding thereby taking advantage of
the adaptive forwarding strategy in NDN [15]. While IP routing produces single
best nexthops or limits its forwarding to equal cost multipath, NDN routing needs
to produce multiple nexthops for each forwarding entry to make the best use of
NDN’s intelligent and adaptive forwarding strategy.
The fourth and ﬁnal design goal is to exploit NDN’s built in data authenticity
features to ensure security of routing updates without exposing them to any
potential security threats. NLSR is directly beneﬁtted from the built in feature of
data authenticity in NDN. As routing updates are NDN packets, which carry name,
data, and a signature, a receiving router can verify the signature of routing update
packets. The router can then ensure that the routing update packet was generated
by an authentic router and was not tampered with during the dissemination
process. The contribution of this thesis towards achieving this design goal is ﬁnding
a secured distribution process for cryptographic certiﬁcates as well a method to
derive trust from these certiﬁcates.
This thesis describes the design choices and rationale to achieve these four main
design goals in NLSR. The goal of this thesis is to present the feasibility and
beneﬁts of using a link state routing protocol in NDN rather than inventing one.
We evaluated NLSR, and compared to IP link state routing protocol it oﬀers more
eﬃcient routing update dissemination, built-in update authentication, and native
support for multipath forwarding. The remainder of this thesis is organized as
follows: Chapter 2 provides brief background knowledge on Named Data
Networking (NDN) and link state routing. Chapter 3 describes design details of our
research work. Chapter 4 presents the evaluation of the NLSR protocol. Chapter 5
3

discusses related works in NDN routing area, chapter 6 presents planned future
works, and ﬁnally, chapter 7 concludes the thesis.

4

2 Background
NDN is an architectural shift from today’s IP, in which the concept of “where” in IP
is replaced with concept of “what”. Instead of forwarding packets to where – the
destination addresses, NDN forwards packets to what – the content that users in
today’s content-driven Internet really care about. In this chapter, we provide the
background on Named Data Networking (NDN) architecture. We also provide a
brief background on Link State Routing protocol at the end of this chapter.

2.1

Named Data Networking

As a result of its continuous evolution, today’s Internet has reached a point where
most of its communication has become content-driven, but the current IP
communication model was designed to be destination-driven. To better suit today’s
content-driven Internet communication pattern, Jacobson et al. proposed a new
Internet architecture: Named Data Networking (NDN) [5]. In this section, we will
brieﬂy discuss the basic concepts of NDN, which is the foundation for our work.

2.1.1

NDN Packets

All packets in NDN are of two types: interest and data as depicted in Figure 2.1.
Interest packets are sent when consumers express interest for data. Each interest
packet carries a name for the desired data, a selector ﬁeld indicating preferences and
restrictions if multiple content matches are found in response to the interest, and a
nonce (a random value used to detect duplicates). Data packets contain a name
which is used to match interest of consumers), the data content, the publisher’s

5

signature, and additional signing information about the publisher’s cryptographic
certiﬁcates, validity, etc.

Figure 2.1: Two types of NDN packets:interest and data

2.1.2

Hierarchical name

Each and every packet in NDN is identiﬁed with a hierarchically-structured name,
which is unique under a scope. For example, this thesis can be named as /memphis.
edu/cs/ahoque/thesis/msthesis.pdf, where each ‘/’ represents a boundary
between name components and is not part of the name. Naming conventions vary
from application to application and are opaque to the network [6]. Because of the
name’s opacity, applications can choose any naming scheme and evolve from the
network independently. Furthermore, this hierarchical naming structure enables
applications to represent a relationship between two pieces of data.

2.1.3

NDN node

Each NDN node has three main components in its forwarding plane [5]: the
Forwarding Information Base (FIB), the Pending Interest Table (PIT), and the
Content Store (CS). The FIB stores forwarding entries used to forward interests
6

towards a potential matching data source(s). Unlike IP, NDN allows a list of
outgoing faces rather than a single, best next-hop or equally costly multi-hops. The
PIT stores the unsatisﬁed interest names along with the faces they are received
from so that data packets can be routed back to the consumers by following the
interest trail. The CS is used for caching data in a NDN node. Figure 2.2 shows the
forwarding plane model of a NDN node taken from [5].

Figure 2.2: Forwarding plane of NDN Node consists of Forwarding Information Base
(FIB), Content Store (CS), and Pending Interest Table (PIT) [5]

2.1.4

Consumer-driven communication

Communication in NDN is consumer-driven, where the consumer initiates
communication by expressing an interest for desired data. A NDN node forwards
this interest to the producer(s) of the data according to the entries in the FIB,
which is populated by a name-based routing protocol. The node also remembers the
name of this interest and adds the incoming face as an entry in the PIT. When the
interest packet reaches a data packet matching its name, the data packet traverses
back toward the consumer by following a reverse path laid out by the interest. All
7

unsatisﬁed interests are recorded in the PIT. If multiple interests exist for the same
name, a NDN node does not forward this interest again upstream since there will
already be a PIT entry matching this name. Instead, another incoming face will be
added to the PIT entry’s face list. Later on when the corresponding data arrives,
the node checks the PIT for the unsatisﬁed matching interest, ﬁnds the list of faces,
and sends the data out to all those faces downstream. So NDN’s forwarding plane
supports multicast packet delivery, as shown in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3: Consumer-driven communication supporting multicast delivery in NDN
[16]

2.1.5

Intelligent forwarding plane

A NDN node preserves the state of each interest in the PIT after forwarding it. So
each entry in the PIT indicates unsatisﬁed interest from the downstream node and
is removed if matching data satisﬁes the interest. This per-packet state information
not only allows NDN to forward packets to multiple faces and avoid loops, along
with the data returning success feedback it also enables NDN to be adaptive in
reaction to network failures. This ultimately leads to ﬁrst alternative path
exploration and better network resource utilization. Moreover, a NDN node can also
limit the rate of incoming packets by limiting the PIT size [6].
8

2.1.6

Data centric security

NDN secures data packet instead of securing communication channels [4, 5]. Each
data packet contains the publisher’s signature, coupled with its name. The
signature, along with the publisher’s information, allows consumers to authenticate
the data, verify its provenance, and derive trust from a model. This security
approach makes data independent of where it comes from, allowing NDN to cache
data anywhere in the network to satisfy any future interest. More importantly, by
leveraging this end-to-end security approach of NDN, consumers and publishers of
data (applications) can tailor and customize their own trust model.

2.2

Link State Routing

Link state routing is a global routing scheme where each router originates Link
State Advertisements (LSAs) about itself, and its connectivity states. These LSAs
are disseminated in the network from router to router. After network convergence,
every router in the network has a map of the network, which is used to
independently compute individual best paths to a reachable destination. The basic
functionality and concepts of link state routing are discussed brieﬂy in this section.

2.2.1

Building Adjacency

Each router maintains a relationship called ‘Adjacency’ with its neighbors after
being discovered via a Hello protocol [7]. Hello packets from the Hello protocol also
serve the purpose of monitoring the adjacency status of neighbors. This adjacency
relationship plays an important role in the Link State Advertisement
synchronization process.

2.2.2

Link State Advertisement (LSA) synchronization

After establishing adjacency with its neighbor, the router builds LSAs by
encompassing its connectivity and state information and sends them out to its
adjacent neighbors using a reliable ﬂooding technique. Each router receiving the
9

LSAs ﬁrst copies them into its own Link State Database (LSDB), then sends them
out again to that router’s adjacent neighbors (except for the incoming one) in an
area. Thus each and every router advertises and gathers knowledge of the network.
Aging and sequencing is applied to expire old LSAs and replace them by
propagating new LSAs respectively.

2.2.3

Routing table calculation

Following network convergence, every router’s LSDB should be identical in a area.
At this point, every router in a area has the same complete picture of the network in
order to compute the shortest path to all reachable destinations. Then each router
builds a network topology from the Link State Database, considering itself as the
root of the network tree, and applies Dijsktra’s shortest path algorithm to calculate
the shortest path to all destinations. After shortest path calculation, each router
generates its own routing table by calculating next-hop to all reachable destination.

10

3 Design and Implementation
NLSR is a link state routing protocol for NDN. Like other link state routing
protocols (OSPF [7], IS-IS [8]), NLSR propagates LSAs for building the network
topology as well as distributes name preﬁx reachability. NLSR discovers,
establishes, and maintains adjacency with neighboring routers. Whenever NLSR
detects any changes in adjacency’s state such as link failure, link recovery, neighbor
router crashing, or neighbor router recovery, it updates the LSA and disseminates
the new LSA to the network. NLSR also advertises name preﬁxes from both static
conﬁguration and dynamic registration by content producers. Upon every deletion
or addition of a name preﬁx, NLSR disseminates a new LSA. NLSR’s LSDB always
keeps the latest version of the LSAs.
NLSR’s such dissemination of LSAs and building the topology may ﬁrst appear
to be very trivial, as identical functionalities have already been implemented in IP
routing protocol. However, since NLSR is implemented on top of NDN, it needs to
use Interest and Data packets, and the design must shift away from the familiar
concepts of destination IP addresses to name preﬁxes and from data pushing into
the network (where any node can simply send any packet to any other node) to data
pulling from it. Therefore, in NDN we have to think in terms of packet names and
data retrieval. To be more precise, we need a methodical naming system for routers,
routing updates (Section 3.1), and router’s cryptographic certiﬁcates (Section 3.6).
Moreover, we need to pull routing updates promptly and without previous
knowledge of when an update may be generated (Section 3.3).
11

In terms of routing functionality, NLSR distinguishes itself from all other link
state routing protocols by two facets: it produces multiple routes for each name
preﬁx in place of single best next-hops, and it signs and veriﬁes all routing updates
messages to ensure that each router can originate and disseminate only its own
preﬁx and connectivity information within the network. We present our route
calculation algorithm in Section 3.4 and our trust model in Section 3.6. As a ﬁrst
step in developing this NDN-based routing protocol, our initial design of NLSR lies
in the context of a single routing domain with a single authority on which our trust
model is built. We truly believe that this design and deployment experience of
NLSR in the NDN research test bed can oﬀer us a concrete stepping stone towards
developing an inter-domain routing protocol that incorporates routing policies and
an inter-domain trust model.

3.1

Naming

Designing a functional naming scheme for each element: routers, routing updates in
the routing system, and the router’s corresponding cryptographic certiﬁcates is
perhaps the most challenging and important element of NLSR’s design. Based on
current operational practices and network structuring schemes, a hierarchical
naming system best suits capturing the relationships among various network
components in the system. This makes it easy to identify routers belonging to the
same network, sites, and messages generated by a speciﬁc router.
Every router in our design is named by following a structured hierarchical
naming scheme. The ﬁrst part of the router name is the network this router belongs
to, the second part is the site owning the router, and the ﬁnal part is the assigned
router name. So a router name becomes of the form /<network>/<site>/
<router>. For instance, an ATT router in Atlanta PoP (point of presence) may be
named /ATT/AtlantaPoP/router7. This way we know that if two routers share the
12

same /<network> preﬁx then they belong to same network, and if they share the
same /<network>/<site> preﬁx, then they belong to same site. This naming
scheme not only makes it easy to ﬁlter out erroneous, unwanted routing messages,
but it also derives trust (Section 3.6).
The NLSR process on a router is denoted by the process name following the
router name: the router name is used as its preﬁx, followed by the process name
that NLSR constitutes to the form/<network>/<site>/<router>/nlsr. This
process name is used in periodic info message exhanges between neighboring routers
for establishing adjacency, detecting failure, or the recovery of either links or routing
processes (Section 3.5). Moreover, this process naming scheme of process provides
the scope of running other routing processes on the same router in the distant
future.
Routing updates are named with the preﬁx /<network>/nlsr/LSA/<site>/
<router>. Ideally, any updates originated by a NLSR process should have the
process preﬁx /<network>/<site>/<router>/nlsr/LSA, indicating that it has
been generated by a NLSR process of router /<network>/<site>/<router>.
However, since our implementation uses ChronoSync [16] to disseminate LSA data
in the network, all routing updates need to share a common routable preﬁx in their
name. ChronoSync does not impose any constraints on the naming of routing
updates however, the fact that it assumes that all data names to be synched are
routable creates a circular reference to the routing process itself. To avoid this
circular indirection, all routing updates generated by a NLSR process share a
common preﬁx /<network>/nlsr/LSA(we call this the <LSA-Prefix>), and append
/<site>/<router> at the end to diﬀerentiate LSAs originated by diﬀerent NLSR
routers.

13

3.2

LSAs

NLSR originates and disseminates three types of LSAs: a) Adjacency LSAs, b)
Preﬁx LSAs, and c) Hyperbolic LSAs. All the LSAs of NLSR have the name format:
/<LSA-Prefix>/<site>/<router>/<LSA-type>/<sequence-no>, where <router>
is the name of the router that originates the LSA, <LSA-type> is the type of LSA
(Preﬁx, Adjacency or Hyperbolic LSAs), and <sequence-no> is an integer used to
determine the ordering of a particular LSA as it changes over time. The Adjacency
LSA is used to advertise all active adjacency with neighboring NDN routers. Each
adjacency link description of an Adjacency LSA contains a neighboring router name
associated with a cost to reach that neighbor. NLSR builds an adjacency list at
startup time and creates the Adjacency LSA. Any changes in the status of any link
to a neighbor or neighboring process detected by periodic “info” Interest messages
(Section 3.5) triggers updates by the propagation of the Adjacency LSA.
Table 3.1: Contents of an LSA
LSA Type
Adjacency LSA
Prefix LSA
Hyperbolic LSA

Content
# Active Links (N), Neighbor 1 Name, Link 1 Cost, ..., Neighbor N
Name, Link N Cost
Name Prefix
Hyperbolic Radius, Hyperbolic Cordinate

The Preﬁx LSA advertises all name preﬁxes (statically conﬁgured and
dynamically advertised by application) that are reachable from the origination
router. Withdrawal or addition of any name preﬁx causes a NLSR router to update
and disseminate the Preﬁx LSA thoughout the network. Hyperbolic LSAs contain
the geometric hyperbolic coordinates of the origination router, which are used for
hyperbolic routing table calculation [9].
In order to remove outdated LSAs caused by router crashes and network
partitions, every router periodically refreshes each of the advertised LSAs by
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generating a newer version with an incremented sequence number. Each LSA has a
lifetime associated with it and is removed from the LSDB when its lifetime expires.
Therefore, if a router crashes, its LSAs will not persist in the network. If a network
is partitioned because of periodical LSA expiration, the LSAs of one partition will
be discarded from another partition to ensure consistency in the network. One
important thing to note here: route calculation should not be impacted by the
obsolete LSAs in NLSR. If a router crashes or a link goes down, its neighbors will
update the status of their LSAs and propagate them throughout the network, so
traﬃc will not be directed towards those routers or by those links. Since we do not
use the refreshes to handle packet losses or state corruption (Sync Protocol handles
that), and the obsolete LSAs do not aﬀect routing table calculations, the LSA
refreshing interval can be set to a relatively long period.

3.3

LSDB Synchronization

For the conceptual simpliﬁcation of our design, we view the LSDB as a collection of
data and the LSDB synchronization problem as a data synchronization problem of
the LSDB as maintained by the routers. Routers periodically exchange their hashes
of the LSDB to detect inconsistencies and recover from them. This synchronization
approach avoids unnecessary ﬂooding to the network – when the network is stable,
as only one hash (instead of all the LSAs) is exchanged between neighbors.
Moreover, it is also receiver-driven, implying that a router will request LSAs only
when it has CPU cycles available.

3.3.1

NDN Synchronization protocol (Sync)

In the early stages of NLSR implementation, NLSR uses the NDN synchronization
protocol [10] to disseminate LSAs to neighboring routers. Sync is associated with
the NDN repository, which allows applications to deﬁne collections of named data
called slices in repo, which are then kept in sync with identically deﬁned slices in
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neighboring repos. Sync computes a hash tree over all the data in a slice and
exchanges the root hash between neighbors to detect discrepancies. If the hash
values do not agree, two neighboring nodes then exchange the hash values with
nodes on the next tree level continuously until they detect the speciﬁc leaf node(s)
causing the problem. They then exchange the data to reach consistency.
Figure 3.1 shows how a LSA is disseminated in the network. To synchronize the
slice containing LSAs, the Sync protocol periodically sends special Interest messages
called Root Advise messages, along with the hash value of the slice, to the
neighboring nodes (step 1). When Router A’s NLSR creates a LSA and writes it in
the Sync slice (step 2), its hash value becomes diﬀerent from that of Router B. This
causes Router A’s Sync to reply to the Root Advise Interest from Router B with the
new hash value of its local slice (step 3). Router B’s Sync then compares the hashes
and recursively requests for the next level of hashes that are causing the diﬀerences.
Eventually, Router B’s Sync identiﬁes the data that needs to be synchronized (LSAs
in the context of NLSR) and retrieves them using Interest messages (step 4 and 5).
The Sync on Router B then sends the data name to the local NLSR agent (step 6),
which fetches the data from the local repo (step 7 and 8) and updates its LSDB
(step 9).

Although the NDN synchronization protocol gives NLSR an eﬃcient hop-by-hop
dissemination of LSAs in network, it fails to notify NLSR in case of frequent
updates in a large network, making NLSR functionally incorrect. Moreover, NDN
synchronization retains all old copies of data, causing memory usage to grow with
each LSA refresh interval by the size of all LSAs in the network, which makes NLSR
unfeasible to run for a relatively longer period.
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Figure 3.1: LSA dissemination process from Router A to Router B via NDN synchronization protocol

3.3.2

ChronoSync

ChronoSync takes a distributed approach instead of a hop-by-hop approach like the
NDN synchronization protocol. ChronoSync forms a cryptographic digest by
summarizing the state of the dataset of the all-involved parties (the router in our
case) in the network, and exchanges it among them. Each entity can detect
diﬀerences in the dataset from the digest and can decide which data to fetch,
whether to fetch, and when to fetch [16].
ChronoSync is implemented as a library, and any application can incorporate it
for dataset synchronization. When there is a data update, ChronoSync increases the
sequence number associated with the data name, computes the digest, and
exchanges the digest with others to fetch the updated data name(s). If there is an
update in any data name, the application can detect it and decide what to do with
that update. However, NLSR itself needs to increase the sequence number of the
LSAs when generating a LSA update instead of letting ChronoSync do it. Therefore
we modiﬁed the ChronoSync library so that it can adapt with the NLSR
requirements of pushing the sequence number with the LSA updates.
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Figure 3.2: LSA dissemination process from router A to Router B via ChronoSync

Figure 3.2 shows how NLSR disseminates LSAs via ChronoSync. Lets assume
that at any stable state both routers have outstanding sync interest on digest d1
(step 1). Router A updates its LSAs and pushes updates to ChronoSync in step 2.
In step 3, ChronoSync calculates digest d2 and sends sync data for outstanding
sync interest on d1. ChronoSync on router B calculates its own digest d2 and both
routers send outstanding interest for fetching future updates (step 5 and 6). In step
7, ChronoSync on router B notiﬁes the NLSR process about the routing update.
Router B then sends interest for the updated LSA to router A in step 8. In step 9,
router A replies back with LSA data in response to step 8’s interest. In step 10,
router B installs the LSA into the LSDB.
ChronoSync’s ability to handle simultaneous data generation without failing to
notify applications and to recover from network partitions makes it an ideal
candidate for routing updates dissemination in order to ensure correctness. Unlike
NDN Sync, ChronoSync does not store any content, which makes it more feasible
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for long-term usage with any application. Because of its correctness and all the
other beneﬁts over NDN synchronization protocol, we chose to use ChronoSync for
LSA dissemination with NLSR.

3.4

Multipath Calculation

Each NLSR node constructs a network topology using the information from the
Adjacency LSAs in the LSDB. Afterwards, it runs a simple extension of the
Dijsktra’s algorithm to produce multiple next-hops for each destination node. But if
a router is conﬁgured to calculate the routing table using hyperbolic information,
NLSR calculates the routing table according to the hyperbolic routing algorithm
presented by Fragkiskos et al [9]. From the Preﬁx LSAs, we know which name preﬁx
is originated from which destination router. So from preﬁx LSA we get destination
router for name preﬁx, and from routing table we obtain list of next-hops to reach
that destination. By combining these two information, we can obtain a list of
next-hops to reach each name preﬁx.
Our multipath calculation using Dijsktra’s algorithm works as follows: It removes
all immediately adjacent links except one, then uses Dijkstra’s algorithm to
calculate the cost of using that link to reach every destination in the topology. This
process is repeated for every adjacent link. In the case of hyperbolic routing
calculation it’s trivial, as the algorithm checks the distance from all neighbors to the
destination and multipath calculation is done in one pass. Afterwards, NLSR ranks
the next-hops for each destination based on the route cost to reach that destination.
Note that NLSR allows the operator to specify the maximum number of paths per
name preﬁx to insert into the FIB, so that the FIB size can be controlled when a
node has many neighbors. However, the computational cost still increases as the
number of neighbors increases, because the algorithm checks through all the
neighboring links to produce the cost for each path and then ranks them.
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Unlike IP, routing information in NDN acts only as a hint to the forwarding
plane. The forwarding plane can observe data delivery performance using state
information maintained in the PIT and then rank the multiple next-hops of a name
preﬁx using the actual observation as well as the ranking from the routing
protocol [15]. However, the ranking information from the routing protocol is still
important in forwarding the initial interest to a name preﬁx and in exploring
alternative routes when the current route fails to retrieve data.

3.5

Failures and Recovery Detection

NLSR sends out periodic “info” interest messages through each link for detecting
link failures and/or remote NLSR process failures. If an “info” interest times out,
NLSR will try re-sending it at speciﬁc times with short intervals to make sure the
interest is not lost. If no response to the “info” interest is received from the
neighbor at the other end, adjacency with that neighbor is considered down. Later
on, NLSR continues to send these periodic “info” interests to detect the recovery of
this adjacency, but at a relatively long interval to avoid high message overhead
during a long-lasting failure. For NLSR processes, it is impossible to determine
whether the remote NLSR process has died or the connecting link has failed.
However, this distinction is insigniﬁcant since in both cases the link should not be
used to forward any kind of traﬃc.

When any failed link recovers or a dead remote NLSR process comes alive, NLSR
will receive a response to the “info” Interest and change that adjacency status to
‘Active’. Any change in adjacency status due to failure/recovery of either a link or a
NLSR process results in updating the Adjacency LSAs, disseminating the LSA
throughout the network, and scheduling routing table calculation. Figure 3.3
illustrates how Node A detects an adjacency failure with Node C and recovery with
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Figure 3.3: Router A’s adjacency failure detection of Router C and adjacency recovery
detection of Router B

Node B.

3.6

Security

Each and every packet in NDN is digitally signed, and the signature is attached as a
part of the packet. The signature covers the content, binds the name with that
content, and includes a small amount of signature information useful in data
veriﬁcation [5]. One piece of the supporting data is the key locator [1, 5], which
indicates the name of the key used to sign the packet so that the receiver can fetch
the certiﬁcates to verify the signature.
A LSA with a valid signature states that the signature was produced using the
public key indicated in the key locator ﬁeld but it does not verify the provenance of
the LSA. For an instance, any attacker can sign a Preﬁx LSA with his key and
inject the LSA into the network. So to check the authenticity of the data, a process
not only needs to verify the signature, but it also must authenticate that this LSA is
indeed signed by an authorized NLSR process. In other words, we need to check
that the key has the correct name of the corresponding NLSR process. This still
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does not eliminate the possibility of an attacker forging a key with the same name.
We then need a trust model to verify the authenticity of the key and a secured
system for key distribution and revocation.

3.6.1

Trust Model

NLSR is an intra-domain routing protocol. In the context of a single network
domain, there is usually a network administrator (a trust anchor) that can certify
the authenticity of keys in the network. Therefore we use this trust anchor for key
signing and veriﬁcation, which is easy to setup and manage. We could let this trust
anchor sign the public key of every router, but this approach presents a greater
security risk when one key is used to sign a large number of keys. Instead, we design
a hierarchy of ﬁve levels that is rooted at the trust anchor, which limits the signing
scope of each key to a smaller size. Table 3.2 shows the name of each key at every
level of the hierarchy. Note that the last component of a key name is always the
hash of the key (not shown in the table), so that when someone expresses an
Interest to a key, the name always matches a speciﬁc key. At the top level of the
hierarchy is a root key owned by the network domain’s administrator. The next
level is a set of site keys, each owned by the administrator of a single site in the
domain (where a site can be a department in an organization or a PoP in an ISP),
that are signed by the root key. Each site key signs a set of operator keys (there
may be more than one operator for a site). Each operator key signs a set of router
keys, each of which signs the key of the NLSR routing process on that router.
Finally, the NLSR key signs the routing data originated by the NLSR process.
Table 3.2: Keys Names
Key Owner
Root
Site
Operator
Router
NLSR

Key Name
/<network>/keys
/<network>/keys/<site>
/<network>/keys/<site>/O.Start/<operator>
/<network>/keys/<site>/R.Start/<router>
/<network>/keys/<site>/.R.Start/<router>/nlsr
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Figure 3.4: Signing and veriﬁcation process of each routing packet

NLSR strictly enforces the trust model rooted at the trust anchor. Figure 3.4
depicts the ﬂow of signing and the veriﬁcation process of each NLSR packet. When
a NLSR router sends a LSA to the network, it signs the packet with its NLSR key
and puts the key name in the ‘SignedInfo/KeyLocator/KeyName’ ﬁeld of the Data
packet. Upon receiving a LSA, a NLSR router fetches the key from its certiﬁcate
store or sends an Interest to fetch the key to complete the veriﬁcation process.
NLSR also checks whether the key indeed belongs to the origination router’s NLSR
process. This process repeats until NLSR reaches the self-signed key of the trust
anchor. If at any step key fetching is unsuccessful, NLSR ﬁnds that an unauthorized
key signed the key, or the ﬁnal veriﬁcation step does not reach the trust anchor, the
LSA is considered illegitimate and its discarded as being unsolicited. Note that once
a key is veriﬁed, we record this information and do not repeat the veriﬁcation on
this key for future packets.

3.6.2

Key Distribution

NLSR distributes keys in the network using ChronoSync during startup time. Each
router publishes an update in the name of its certiﬁcate with a new sequence
number. Other routers receiving these update messages from ChronoSync fetch
these certiﬁcates and try to verify each certiﬁcate by looking at the certiﬁcate
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names included in the signed information (Section 3.6.1). If signer certiﬁcates are
available in the certiﬁcate store and the router can verify the certiﬁcate, it is stored
in certiﬁcate store. Otherwise, the router sends an interest to fetch the signer
certiﬁcate. This process continues until the router reaches its trust anchor.
Certiﬁcates are discarded for the same reason a data packet is discarded as
described in the previous section. Associating a sequence number with certiﬁcates
also allows NLSR to revoke signing keys and certiﬁcates. The router needs to
publish updates of certiﬁcate names with a new greater sequence number. Other
routers will fetch this certiﬁcate and replace older certiﬁcate with the newer
certiﬁcate after successful validation by NLSR.

3.7

Implementation

Figure 3.5 shows the block diagram of modular NLSR implementation. Mainly,
NLSR can be divided into four components: a) LSDB b) Routing c) Security and d)
Communication. The LSDB stores all LSAs (Section 3.2) from the network during
the LSDB Synchronization process described in Section 3.3. The routing module
builds a network topology by gathering knowledge from the LSDB, it calculates the
routing table (Section 3.4), and it generates the FIB for NDN. The security module
implements the trust model, stores certiﬁcates, signs outgoing data packet, and
authenticates incoming data packets before any processing (Section 3.6).

The communication module consists of three sub-modules: i) Data Manager, ii)
Interest Manager, and iii) Sync Logic Handler (SLH). The Interest Manager is
responsible for sending out and receiving interest. The received interest is forwarded
to the Data Manager for further processing. The Data Manager takes care of
sending out data in response to incoming interest, and it processes incoming data
from neighbors. The Data Manager communicates with the security module to sign
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Figure 3.5: Block diagram of NLSR modules

data before sending it out and to validate any incoming data packet. The SLH is
responsible for publishing LSA updates in the network and for notifying NLSR
about updates from the network. The LSDB module informs SLH about LSA
updates, incorporating LSA names with the latest sequence number. The SLH
publishes updates to the attached ChronoSync. ChronoSync then synchronizes
updates across the network. When ChronoSync detects any updates from network,
it immediately notiﬁes the SLH. The SLH communicates with the Interest Manager
to fetch this update. The inbound/outbound arrows attached to the Interest
Manager and Data Manager connects them to the neighboring NLSR process, and
the arrow from ChronoSync connects it to the neighboring ChronoSync process.
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4 Evaluation
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of NLSR in terms of processing time,
messaging overhead, and convergence time. For conducting tests, we built a network
consisting of six heterogeneous nodes with diﬀerent operating systems and
speciﬁcations. Figure 4.1 shows the topology we used to represent these results.
Although refresh time for LSAs can be set at long intervals (Section 3.2), in order to
test the protocol in a short period of time we set the refresh time to be every 30
minutes instead of on the order of days. This allowed us to carefully observe all
functionality and measures of performance in a short period of time.

Figure 4.1: Network Topology

Figure 4.2 represents the CPU usage of the NLSR process at each node. The
number in parenthesis following the node name indicates the degree of the node
(how many active neighbors that are connected to the node). It is evident from
Figure 4.2 that the nodes with a higher degree of connectivity in the network
exhibit higher CPU usage, which means the computational or processing cost
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increases linearly with the number of active links of nodes. This behavior is
exhibited by NLSR mainly because of the per-link shortest path calculation
(section 3.4), and a higher message-exchanging overhead.

Cumulative CPU (Jiffies = 1/100 second)
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Figure 4.2: NLSR CPU utilization increases proportinately with the number of active
link

Figure 4.3 demonstrates the comparison of NLSR’s processing overhead with and
without the proposed trust model. It is notable that even with the proposed trust
model, which requires multiple levels of keys to sign and verify a packet, the extra
processing cost is hardly signiﬁcant. This is due to the fact that NDN by default
signs all outgoing data packets. The only noticeable diﬀerence between the two
schemes is the veriﬁcation process. NLSR, with the proposed trust system,
distributes keys at the startup, which increases the probability of having a high
certiﬁcate store hit ratio during the veriﬁcation process. NLSR only requires
fetching new certiﬁcates; it stores the certiﬁcates once after veriﬁcation, resulting in
a very low CPU cost. Figure 4.3 further illustrates the higher CPU usage of
multipath routing calculation as opposed to single path routing calculation. Since
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the CPU cost due to messaging is the same in both schemes, the diﬀerence here is
mainly due to the higher processing cost of multipath calculation.

Cumulative CPU (Jiffies = 1/100 second)
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Figure 4.3: NLSR’s Average CPU utilization: even with key management NLSR has
almost same CPU utilization for both multi and single path

For the convergence test, we used the same topology shown in the Figure 4.1.
After booting up all the nodes, we waited long enough to let all the LSDBs
synchronize. Once the network was in a converged state, we generated traﬃc using
the ccnping utility [13]. We hosted the ccnping server on node 6, while node 2 was
used to generate ccnping ping messages (Interest) with a default timeout value of 4
seconds. After 60 seconds we brought down node 4, which forces the ping messages
from node 2 to take an alternative path to reach node 6. Figure 4.4 shows the
beneﬁts of multipath routing, wherein node 2 did not need to recalculate the path
again. Instead, traﬃc moved to an alternate path as soon as the failure was
detected. NLSR with single path calculation, however, took more than a minute to
ﬁnd the alternative route and moved back to old router as soon as we restored the
link. Note that the convergence time can be ﬁne-tuned by tweaking the values of
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the “info” interest interval, its time out value, and the “info” interest’s retry number
(which were set to 60 seconds, 15 seconds and 3 times respectively for this test).
With these values and conﬁguration settings, link failure detection can take
anywhere from 45-105 seconds. By reducing the values, NLSR convergence time can
be reduced, but it will result in increasing the number of routing messages
throughout the network.

NLSR Convergence Time
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Figure 4.4: NLSR convergence time with & without multipath support. With multipath support traﬃc takes alternative path immediately(blue), but single path takes
about 60 seconds to converge

Table 4.1 shows the number of messages exchanged by OSPFN (Section 5).
Table 4.2 demonstrates the number of messages exchanged by NLSR. NLSR
exchanges slightly more messages (11.8 messages per link per minute) than
compared to OSPFN (10.2 messages per link per minute). With the current
implementation, each NLSR process sends interest messages to fetch data when it
gets a notiﬁcation for an LSA update, which results in extra message exchanges for
interest and data. We can reduce these LSA interest and data exchanges by piggy
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Table 4.1: OSPFN Message Count

Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Node 5
Node 6
Total/Type
Avg/Node
Avg/Link
Avg/Link/Min

Links
2
2
4
3
2
3
16
2.7
1

Hello
1446
1441
2886
2166
1442
2165
11546
1924.3
721.6
6

LS Update
728
884
1250
1040
697
1235
5834
972.3
364.6
3

LS Ack
296
161
739
457
321
324
2298
383
143.6
1.2

Total/Node
2470
2486
4875
3663
2460
3724
19678
3279.7
1229.9
10.2

backing the updated LSA data with sync data. This improvement will reduce the
number of messages exchanged by NLSR to 9.04 per link per minute (presented in
table 4.3), which is lower than the number of messages exchanged by OSPFN

Table 4.2: NLSR Message Count

Links
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Node 5
Node 6
Total/Type
Avg/Node
Avg/Link
Avg/Link/Min

2
2
4
3
2
3
16
2.7
1

Info
Interest
242
242
484
363
242
363
1936
322.7
121
1

Info
Data
241
241
484
363
242
363
1934
322.3
120.9
1

Sync
Interest
1204
1237
2199
1855
1141
1770
9406
1567.7
587.9
4.9
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Sync
Data
534
419
1413
686
365
667
4084
680.7
255.3
2.1

LSA
Interest
426
386
805
671
451
633
3372
562
210.8
1.8

LSA
Data
278
235
627
300
147
431
2018
336.3
126.1
1.1

Total
/Node
2925
2760
6012
4238
2588
4227
22750
3791.7
1421.9
11.8

Table 4.3: NLSR Message Count
Links
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Node 5
Node 6
Total/Type
Avg/Node
Avg/Link
Avg/Link/Min

2
2
4
3
2
3
16
2.7
1

Info
Interest
242
242
484
363
242
363
1936
322.7
121
1

Info
Data
241
241
484
363
242
363
1934
322.3
120.9
1
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Sync
Interest
1204
1237
2199
1855
1141
1770
9406
1567.7
587.9
4.9

Sync
Data
534
419
1413
686
365
667
4084
680.7
255.3
2.1

Total
/Node
2221
2139
4580
3267
1990
3163
17360
2893
1085
9.04

5 Related Work
Very limited work has been done in the routing area of NDN. We previously
developed OSPFN [14], an extension of OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) for
routing in NDN, and deployed this routing extension in the NDN research test bed.
OSPFN deﬁnes a new type of Opaque LSA to carry name preﬁxes in routing
messages. It installs the best next-hop to each name preﬁx in the FIB, and
additionally operators may manually conﬁgure a list of alternative next-hops for
OSPFN to install in the FIB. Although OSPFN can build a FIB with name preﬁxes,
it has signiﬁcant limitations. As with conventional IP routing protocols, OSPFN
still uses IP addresses as router IDs, relies on GRE tunnels to cross legacy networks,
and computes only a single best next-hop for each name preﬁx. Experience from
OSPFN deployment suggests that managing IP addresses and tunnels are major
operational problems, and inadequate multipath support limits NDN’s eﬀectiveness.
The routing protocol proposed by Dai et al. [2] is similar to NLSR on the
surface, but it diﬀers from NLSR in the following aspects: Firstly, it uses OSPF to
collect the topology and compute shortest path, whereas NLSR uses ChronoSync to
disseminate routing updates. Secondly, their routing message exchanges do not
follow basic NDN philosophy, and therefore cannot exploit advantages oﬀered by
NDN like built-in security. Finally, their multipath forwarding is limited to content
served by multiple producers.
Torres et al proposed a Controller-based Routing Scheme (CRoS) for NDN [12].
The controllers store the network topology, calculate the routes, and store named
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data locations so that they can install a route for any named data in the network.
The idea of having decentralized controllers is very intriguing, however the network
needs to be ﬂooded with specially formatted Interest messages to search for
controllers, which can ultimately lead to high routing message overhead.
In [11], the authors proposed a Cooperative Routing Protocol, which focuses on
a FIB reconstruction based on the content retrieval statistics of a router. In this
scheme, the authors deﬁne the network as a set of requester routers (generating or
receiving interests and forwarding them to next-hop routers if the content is not
available in the Content Store) and provider routers (advertising name preﬁxes, i.e.
connected to producers). Based on the content retrieval statistics, one router
reconstructs FIB entries to aggregate multiple ﬂows of interest for similar content.
Although the proposed scheme improves network performance, it uses content
retrieval statistics to reconstruct FIB, which would not be possible if the FIB was
not constructed by some other routing protocol ﬁrst. In [3], the authors proposed
the name-based routing scheme NetInf, which adopts a hierarchical Distributed
Hash Table (DHT for name-based routing. The authors proposed to have DHTs for
each Point of Presence (PoP) for name resolution. These PoP-level DHTs are
aggregated into a higher-level DHT for the resolution of names in a larger domain.
The topmost DHT in the NetInf hierarchy (known as REX) stores indices for all the
content in the network. This huge scale of indices storing for each content in the
topmost DHT creates a network performance bottleneck.
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6 Future Work
NLSR functions in a single authoritative area/domain. With the growth of NDN, it
will also need to mature to function in multiple domains. This work is the ﬁrst step
towards the development of an inter-domain routing protocol for NDN. Moreover,
this current simple implementation of multipath calculation results in a linear
increase in CPU processing time with the number of neighboring nodes. We will
investigate this multipath calculation algorithm to improve the performance of
NLSR.
NLSR uses ChronoSync for LSA dissemination, which eﬀectively distributes the
names of the updates across the network, however NLSR still needs to send Interests
throughout the network to fetch these updates. But if the updated data could
piggy-back on the sync data exchanges (which contain only names), then NLSR
would not have to send those extra Interest messages, resulting in decreased message
exchanges, reduced network convergence time, and improved routing eﬃciency.
The trust model functions properly under the assumption that NLSR will be
within a single authoritative domain where a single entity is the trust anchor. But
in multiple authoritative domains, prior assumption will no longer stand, and this
trust model then will need to ﬁnd an eﬀective way to determine a trust anchor and
derive trust, which is also a future goal of this NDN routing research.
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7 Conclusion
The design of Link State Routing protocol is a long studied, well-understood
subject for IP. However, devising an eﬃcient Link State Routing protocol for NDN
has proved to be an interesting challenge, and our design of NLSR so far has served
as a great learning experience. NLSR departs from the conventional IP-based
routing protocol’s single path forwarding with multiple path forwarding options,
and it also propagates name reachability to meet NDN’s routing needs. Our key
gains from this experience, have come from NLSR speciﬁcally needing to develop a
new application on top of NDN, which requires a systemic name space design,
careful design of a trust model for key authentication, and most importantly,
thinking through adjustments to NDN’s design pattern. The results represent the
ﬁrst step of our endeavor to explore new routing schemes and extend into
inter-domain routing for NDN.
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